By Gianfranco La Grassa*
For (theoretical) convenience I have always used the tripartition of the society in three “spheres”, three great areas never factually separated by clear delimitations of a boundary): political, economic (with a productive and a financial subsphere) and ideological that I sometimes name ideological – cultural to indicate, on one hand, everything that moves in the field of ideas, of points of view, of the battles between these(i), and on the other hand, the deposits accumulated during this movement in the course of long periods of time in certain social environments, also provided with a territory (usually it is what we call a country, and often from a certain period onwards, even a nation).
Each sphere consists of a group of apparatuses, with an organized structure that pursues given objectives. In the political sphere, such organisms are concentrated around the State (the historical formation of which I will not enter into) the official purpose of which is to carry out the general functions of maintenance of a given society that inhabits a certain country. Then there are the organizations called parties, constructed precisely to seize power in managing the State (and its general functions carried out within the territories of the different countries) In certain circumstances – and also according to a series of cultural deposits formed in the various and different countries – one party excludes all the others and takes over the complete control of the State; whereas in other circumstances, a competition takes place between the various parties, in general subject to regulations
that differ from one country to another and from one historic phase to another. It is possible therefore to have so-called dictatorships or the equally so-called democracies.
Etymologically, democracy means “government by the people” but “the people” is a term used for convenience; it should mean a group of people living in a given social-geographic and cultural context, all declared equal and given equal rights and duties. This is above all the liberal definition, therefore founded on a specific ideology, particularly simplified and rudimentary. For others, the people are a variegated amalgam of social groups that can be classified according to different criteria; and amongst which there are relations that are also subject to theoretical analysis based on the needs of those who intend to study that given society and clarify its characteristics considered the most essential and decisive, the most appropriate to identify the path of development considered most appropriate for the society in question. According to this second concept, more complex and articulated than the liberal one, it cannot at all be unanimously and unalterably decided what kind of regime - “dictatorial” or “democratic”, both in various possible configurations and modulations – is most adapted to the various countries and in the different circumstances and (most ample) historic phases.
In the political sphere, in any case, the States are still today (structured) aggregations of fundamental apparatuses in the government of the various countries and therefore in the relations between them. It has been attempted to make believe in their obsolescence through the creation of international organisms. The clamorous failure of the Society of Nations, and today, increasingly obvious, that of the U.N.O. demonstrate the futility of such a façade ideology, where ideology has its worst meaning of authentic and conscious use of such so-called international organisms, at least as far as the most relevant decisions are concerned, in the interest of one (or few) of the countries represented there (in the present historic phase, above all the United States). The same can be said of our poor E.U. reduced in fact to an instrument of the aforementioned power, despite the efforts made by certain parties of European countries to make believe that one or more of these, for example Germany intend to conquer with high-handedness a role of predominance; in any case, only a few people think that the E.U. “democratically” represents the will of the countries of our continent, all equal, all with equal rights and duties.
Moving on to the economic sphere – which in fact must be subdivided, given the generalized mercantile nature of the economies defined as capitalist, into productive and financial – the fundamental apparatuses are those called businesses, of which, once again, the most simplistic concept, that of the liberals, preaches “virtuous” competition in the field of the so-called “free market”, a field in which autonomy and self-subsistence are envisaged, based on simple criteria of efficiency in business management, and therefore the predominance of this or that firm in the production – of goods and services, in any case merchandise – at a lower cost and consequently sold at a lower prices.
In reality, competition is a conflict in which economic efficiency counts only partially (characterized by the principal of the minimum means) largely assisted, on the other hand, by the more complex activities of these apparatuses in their varied relations with the other social spheres and, in particular with politics. However, there is too much tendency to see the economic sphere as the main and dominating one in the society and to treat its apparatuses, the businesses, in terms of organisms structured according to certain criteria, linked in fact to efficiency. The relation between the economy and the other spheres are relations between individuals or groups of individuals who consider themselves characterized by “sentiments” of the personal kind, in particular, the desire to acquire power and even more so, riches; it is in fact almost always the latter that is put in front of all else, since power can be achieved through riches, and is therefore a subordinate variable. At the service of every ambition, substantially attributable to the individual, are deceit, lies, corruption, constraint (when possible), etc. etc.
Since every ambition is conditioned by the wealth possessed, what matters is the availability of the latter, according to criteria of the most rapid and flexible usability, which is obviously – in a society of mercantile generalization of productive activity – in monetary form or that which is equivalent to it, thus, consequently, the function pertinent to the financial sphere is always emphasized, as if it were the source of every power, in the worst or the best sense of its use. In the final analysis, all the most relevant social events, including those events involving warfare, are attributed to money, to the desire to accumulate it and to the way it is used which often provokes the most acute crises of every kind. The financial sphere is thus considered the principal, predominant social sphere, the cause of the most important events and since the general tendency is to put the “demoniacal” aspect of every event in the foreground, the financial sphere and the greed for money are considered the most decisive amongst all sources of social evil.
Finally, there is the ideological sphere and, in the more general sense, the cultural sphere, because it is the deposit over a very long period of ideological conflict related to the successive historic eras, through which the various social formations have passed. This sphere does not have its own apparatuses, since they are either a part of the structure of the State or are organized in the form of an enterprise. Its main characteristic is represented by the occupation of particular roles, in any case utilized in the apparatuses of the economic or political kind by intellectuals, being persons that carry out special functions concerning the ideological struggle and the transmission from one generation to the next of the knowledge and the thinking (“deposited”) that are a part of a particular culture. The intellectuals are either explicitly hinged in the apparatuses in question or are apparently free to use their power of reasoning, in any case, with some exceptions, (frequent only in periods of crisis and changeover from one social formation to another), such persons only carry out (sometimes without knowing it) functions that contribute to the reproduction of a given structure of social relations.
If this is the configuration - theoretically considered and analysed – of the different spheres that constitute the society, quite different, as we have always remarked, is the more specific sense (meaning and direction of orientation) of that which we usually call politics. We intend to refer to the series of moves, already indicated several times, made by given social agents, a series of moves coordinated in that which we call strategy and that the agents implement in a confrontation (clash) with the intention of prevailing one over the others. The strategy has nothing to do with moves made haphazardly, in complete disorder, pure primitive reaction, almost instinctive, to a stimulus coming from outside, as is often the agitation just as chaotic of other antagonists. The strategy implies an order of succession of the moves, certainly not deterministic but however still founded on a studied concatenation of the same and of the research, through them, of the maximum possible effectiveness (a concept completely different from that of efficiency) in relation to the pursued goal: success and supremacy.
Before carrying out a strategy, it is therefore necessary to construct it as a coordination of moves having a well pre-established scope. Nothing is constructed without a preliminary exploration of its field of application. The exploration is followed by a more precise analysis of its field, that is, of the fundamental elements of which it is composed and that give it its particular noteworthy characteristics; without previously establishing these characteristics, it is not possible to move, if not in disorderly fashion and in the most diverse directions, placing oneself at the mercy of other contestants who have applied themselves scientifically to the study of the strategy to adopt in that field. Besides the field, it is necessary to consider and evaluate, as well as possible, the position, the strength, and the strategic intentions of the other adversaries involved in the game and in that lapse of time (sometimes an entire historic phase). All this is sufficient? Not at all: it is important but not sufficient.
If we limit ourselves to operate according to what has just been briefly mentioned, we evidently have a concept of “reality” where we move in a mere interaction between the agents in conflict; in other words, a sort of carrier for the various forces in the field. Such a concept refers to the conviction that it is possible to eliminate every gap between “subject” and “object”, asserting their indissoluble unity. Separation is only fictitious, cultivated by individuals, based on mere appearance. Instead, the “reality” is unitary: in fact, subject and object, in reality, don’t exist. One fuses into the other. This is in my opinion the most naïve and primitive concept, the source of innumerable disasters. Because, no matter how such theses are masked, they relate to the fundamental idea, according to which the subject creates its own object. Moreover, even those that maintain that the object is a factor in itself and the subject must identify itself with it, that is, adhere to it (intuitively and immediately), create a false object (a semblance of “reality”) which is no other than the thinking of the subject “condensed” into an object to which they attribute form and substance.
As far as I am concerned, I am in favour of a decisive dualism, a net separation of subject and object, with the clarification that the subject is active; it does not adhere passively (with more or less conscious make-believe) to the object with which it must integrate and unite, practically merge. Even the contemplative subject acts as much as that which is active par excellence, believing ( or pretending) that it only adheres to the reality that passes, while in fact it intervenes, even if only with its inaction, it interprets it and attempts to bend it to its objectives, whilst appearing motionless. It is often a sly actor, one that it is best to be wary of, because it could attempt with this behaviour to instigate and manipulate the action of other subjects, against those who act without a mask of any kind. And even if it doesn’t do it consciously, it is equally, sometimes even more, dangerous. The contemplative subject must never be ignored by those that are in conflict and struggle for supremacy, in certain cases, it should be eliminated first of all, as well as those that preach love, cooperation and the like, deadly weapons in the hands of “universal” prevaricators.
Once the dualism subject/object is accepted as an indispensable horizon, care must be taken not to cultivate their relationship “naively”. According to me, the assertion of Marx (introduction of ’57) by which the “reproduction of the tangible along the path of thought” is possible, belongs to this naïve concept. The “tangible” should be the object - the reality outside us, the field in which we act – being characterized by the elements that structure it, including the other actors that we struggle against. In fact, we do not reproduce the tangible, we only represent it; and its structure (created by us) is born from our need to act in stability, pretending that the field will remain such for an adequate period of time: just moments in a dual with the sword, perhaps decades or centuries in the consideration of given “natural realities” which we bring to our (constructive) attention, to use them according to “historically determined” goals.
The important thing is to be aware that these representations are not the reality, but not even a simple fantasizing; it is the way of behaving in the necessary conditions that we have to act in. Sometimes it seems that there is no movement but it always present. I have sometimes, on other occasions, mentioned the example of a man standing to attention, stationary, He seems motionless, but there is an incessant movement of his muscles to create that impression. The movement is tiring and the apparent immobility can sometimes end with a real collapse. Not even fantasizing is an “escape from reality” it is another way of behaving in action, sometimes due to recognizing a defeat in advance, other times as an attempt to overcome the difficulties that seem to lead to a defeat. But let’s not complicate the subject; otherwise we’ll never get to the end of it.
Ultimately, there is never a reproduction (worse still, a mirroring) of reality, and not even an identification of the subject with the object. And we should also cease making incorrect reference to the principal of indetermination of quantum microphysics, on which so many philosophers have given freerein to their imagination, convinced that they possessed enough scientific knowledge, which in reality they did not have, as shown so brilliantly, in my opinion, by Sokal and Bricmont in their Intellectual Impostures. First of all, it is necessary to start with the conflicting intertwining of the actions of a number of “subjects” who, for that purpose, place themselves outside a “reality”, constructed by them in the most realistic way possible, as a field of stability on which to deploy themselves, to proceed then to think of the ongoing conflict and move adequately in it; sometimes it is a matter of conflict between theoretical positions, between ideas and theoretical positions, which however represent, perhaps through a series of intermediary passages, a more acute and direct “conflict between groups” to assume a position of supremacy.
Let’s take, for example, the typical concept of neoclassical economy. It imagines the preliminary absence of the market – of which the generalization, through historic processes of transmutation of the previous social formation into the capitalistic society is the real cause of the theorisation of that school of thought – and it formulates a series of economic laws, eternal and unchangeable, starting with the supposed relation between an individual (a human subject) who has needs and the means able to satisfy them. These laws are then used to study the competition in the area of the supposed “free market”. This theoretical approach, without imagining a devious activity of contraposition to another theory (in fact, the Marxist theory), it has, in any case, served the purpose of shifting the axis of reflection from a field occupied by the social classes, thought of as collective subjects, dominator and dominated (“exploiter and exploited”), in conflict with each other, to the space of a rivalry (competition) between single “subjects”, free and equal.
Each time we represent a given “reality”, in terms of a field in which there is a struggle for supremacy, according to the modalities briefly outlined above, we can be sure that such construction will be shown, in a certain period of time, not established beforehand, to have precise limits. To continue wanting to adhere to it, at any cost – a typical attitude of those that forget its character of usefulness for action (still remembering that everything is action, even that which appears contrary to such a definition) believing in it unconditionally – in the end, leads its followers to defeat and to the progressive disappearance of such representations. In order to stay sufficiently elastic and ready for changes in the way of thinking, regarding given realities, a supplementary hypothesis is necessary.
We must suppose the existence of a world, irreducible to us, to the changing of which we certainly contribute, acting (in reciprocal conflict) but all in all, in a “non essential” way; a world that we are obliged to subject to activities called cognitive, without insisting on knowing its “real being”. A world that is presumed to be in continuous oscillation, vibration, turmoil or however we want to define its incessant volatility that never has a moments of effective and constant balance. In certain of its divisions (for example: “the heavens” but not only) this world experiences oscillations and changes of such a duration in time that, to our “sensibility” (even if instrumentally very developed), it appears sufficiently balanced and stabile, having a constant movement determined, not by chance, with (physical) “laws”. However that must not induce us to think the opposite to what is pointed out above; otherwise we could often become intransigent with theoretic constructions that, in the end, show a diminishing capacity to orient our movements in the world.
Without doubt, we would feel very awkward, if we behaved like “agent subjects” in a situation of unbalance, vibration and oscillation. It is therefore obligatory for us to fix “laws” (of movement) by constructing a field of possible accessibility. Ultimately, we think of a world capable of balance and constant movement, that it would be possible to know in its reality, provided with stability and the invariability of its essential characteristics, considered atemporal. And when this reality is the society in which we are more directly placed as subjects capable of organization and cooperation, or instead, of conflict, we must be especially aware, through our reasoning, that it is an unstable and oscillating world.
And so it is indispensable to devote ourselves with particular flexibility to the construction – the scope of which needs theories, without insisting on knowing the truth!- of fields of stability necessary to act, day after day or for entire historic phases (with the various intermediary gradations). However, without centering obstinately on the constructions already completed, that will always be made obsolete by the so-called events – in periods more or less long, depending on the fields that concern them – and therefore requiring periodic revisions, often very radical.
Borrowing an expression used in very different contexts, “in the final analysis”, that which decides the realism of a given theory, as a guide of our actions, is the success or otherwise of the same, in achieving the scope that has been pursued with it. Being very careful of the way we behave “in theory”. First of all, “realism” does not mean the reproduction of “reality”; the real “reality” cannot be doubted. It is something fluid, oozing, elusive, in continuous movement and transmutation, something in which we get bogged down if we insist on adhering to it. Realism only implies that we are not fantasizing, but are attempting to immobilize the changeable and fluid in such a way that enables us, anyhow, to achieve successes, being aware that they are, in any case, only temporary. Realism also includes taking note that stability, attributed by the theory to the world in which we agitate ourselves, is obligatory as far as the manner of our actions is concerned, but without drawing on any “real reality”. This latter in fact, must be presumed always in vibrant movement, jolting, unbalancing; for this reason, every theory must be considered transitory.
There are undoubtedly “great thoughts” of very diversified kind: for example on death, on what is supposed to happen to us after death, on the “ultimate” sense of the immense world, in the tiniest part of which we are immersed, a sense on which fantasizing is obviously admitted that most helps human beings to live in various eras, in diverse societies, with different “cultural deposits”. Etc. etc. Nobody wants to deny the relevance of such thoughts that have always been and always will be. Nevertheless, theory has little to do with them. It must keep away from them; it must stick to the scope of acting in the so-called concrete world. Such acting, I repeat, must create itself a stable image of the latter, stiffened and therefore “not real”. Stability serves the purpose, again “in the final analysis” of fighting a battle for the supremacy between “social groups” configured in various ways, on the basis of the economic, political or ideological role performed in different societies in given historic eras.
Some groups want to conserve the existing social order; others want to change it, according to the convenience considered appropriate by one or other of the groups in conflict. Within the struggle for the social order, different and particular conflicts take place regarding specific sectors of the society. Among these, there is also the sector in which the struggle for supremacy takes as its own object the validity or not of this or that theory, likewise in the domain of the theory regarding the “natural realities”. To give a simple example, in the “Galileo Galilei” of Brecht, despite the excessive simplification of the terms and the nature of the conflict, one can gather some social (and political) aspects of the bitter dispute over the thesis of heliocentricity. The “great thinkers” have to limit themselves to attempting to interpret the so-called “world spirit”, which is non other than the combination of the characteristic beliefs of different “historic eras of social formation”. Bearing in mind that these social formations have never been unified in one, but rather diverge for their subsistence in various geographic-social contexts, characterized by a relatively common history and by consequent “cultural deposits” that are not separated beyond certain limits (but still sufficient to create conflicts and struggles for the affirmation of one’s own “being” (that which is considered such and superior to others).
It is not these “great thinkers” that are responsible for the victory of certain subjective bearers of the most compulsory needs of given particular formations (for a long time now linked in fact to countries) and of social groups within these formations; achieving success or not is the task of those that devise the strategy of the conflict, that is, the agents of politics in its more specific sense that concerns every environment (sphere) of the society: politics (its apparatuses), economy (businesses in first place) and ideology. It is above all the first two – and in capitalism, in the era of more modern social formation, the second of these – which have the greatest impact in the struggle for victory (in the “war and not in “single battles”). The “great thinkers”, those that impregnate the “cultural deposits of various social formations for a long time, seem to direct and move “great masses”; ultimately though, if a long lasting conflict or one of particular intensity and relevance is lost because of incapacity or unfavourable battle conditions for given agents of the strategies (of politics), the “masses” that are influenced by the latter are dispersed and then reunite, even perhaps after a long time, under the protection of new “ideological formations”, which usually cooperate in the stability of the success of the victorious agents.
When it is asserted, and, in my opinion, entirely correctly so, that politics are always and in any case at the helm, it is necessary to fully understand the significance of such an affirmation. It does not mean, in my view, that the apparatuses of the political sphere, and therefore the subjects placed in a commanding role in them, occupy a privileged post compared to those of other spheres in the society.
The real sense of the affirmation lies in politics meant as a sequence of moves that are part of a strategy to fight the battle in the society ( in a certain social area, more or less vast, at the “superior” limit, the world society) to take over control of its decisive parts. This type of politics permeates the entire social formation and therefore its various spheres (while remembering that the subdivision of a society into these spheres has a largely instrumental character, it is still “doing theory”).
The fact that, in the activity of politics, one or other of the social spheres is predominant (with their apparatuses and their agents in commanding roles) is a “fact” linked to various “concrete” historic eras – in many cases specific circumstances, bearing in mind the balance of power between the different particular formations (countries) and between the various social groups within them. It is in this context that the words of Lenin regarding the “concrete analysis of concrete situations” make sense. Be wary of interpreting such a phrase in its more flatly empiric sense (beyond what the great revolutionary intended) Let’s start, to give a well known example, from one of the conclusions of this Leninian theory: the consideration of the “weak link in the chain of imperialism” (represented by Russia in 1917); which implies the equally fundamental conclusion, according to which revolutions succeed not so much where the revolutionary forces are strongest (and most numerous, followed by great masses, according to the beliefs of the most superficial revolutionaries, who, in fact lose the “war” and often their lives as well, but rather where the reactionaries are weaker and with their institutions in disarray, their “commanders” demotivated and the “troups” in disorderly movement and often on the run, no longer receiving deployment orders.
And so, the thesis of the weak link does not refer to the simple empiric analysis of a given arrangement of the forces in a brief circumstance. It is rather an effective strategic thesis that, not by chance, served the purpose of opposing and overcoming the doubts (and the opportunisms) of those (even the Bolsceviks) that affirmed the need to await the advancement of the democratic- bourgeois revolution, from which would also emerge a stronger and more numerous “working class” (the revolutionary subject par excellence, according to the Marxists of the scholastic species). The only error of Lenin –which it has only been possible to judge, based on historic experience, in the very last few decades, and exclusively by those who have a brain to reason with – was the belief that such a thesis did not ultimately contradict traditional Marxism and its theoretical cornerstones. This was not so, and it was believed for too long that the revolution, which followed after the Second World War was a prolonging of the so-called proletariat revolution (of the “Class” by antonamasia) in many subsequent “weak points”. In its “strong points” - the true capitalist countries with a high number of labourers (not at all a Class!) – there has never been the smallest twinkling of revolution after 1945, and those previous few uprisings , like the Spartacists in the post-Great War period, in Germany were not much better than a Pisacane in 19th century Italy before unification or a Guevara amongst the Bolivian peasants, oblivious of the intentions of such an “intruder”.
However, today, those who know how to reason – not the leftovers that advocate an “ethic and religious” communism which, after all, is preached by certain perfect charlatans in the attempt to gather a few more votes from the remaining brainless members of a movement, in other times very incisive and overflowing with effective hopes – is aware of the necessity to abandon Marxism as it was formulated. All things considered, the best (or least bad) definition of this theoretic movement is the one given years ago by Althusser: Marx has opened the Continent of History to science. In effect, I continue to hold that an analysis of historical phenomena, based only on the conflict between States and countries, between religions or, in a more general sense, between cultures, ethnic groups, etc. etc., is not without sense, but remains rather on the surface of processes that concern – in my opinion, much more fundamentally –certain social groups within each State, each country, each religion and culture (and language), each ethnic group and so on. The real problem is that Marxism closed itself in a cocoon with the analysis of capitalism in its first affirmation, achieved in England, and believed it could generalize that experience – moreover, just emerged from its “first industrial revolution”- shaping the course of history on the class struggle between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat (which was non other than the working class). From which a substantial failure derived, obstinately never admitted by the later Marxists (not even by Lenin, who, fortunately though, followed other strategic theses in the revolution, which were effectively revisionist.
This failure, which was a failure of theory, before being practical-political – theory is the maximum level of the practical, since it ultimately serves the guided action of human beings, entirely different in this aspect from the animals – has made us revert to the need to follow other theories of the society, and of the conflict in them, in my opinion, more primordial and rudimentary than Marxism. The reverting consisted, in my opinion, precisely in the inability to analyse the conflict between social groups, going beyond the superficial level represented by the “cement” of culture, (language), religion, and so on. Today, we too, that have studied Marxism, are often obliged to revert to sovranism (or autonomy or neutrality etc.), in a certain sense, we are obliged to “pay the duties” for errors committed for such a long time. In this phase, we find ourselves in the middle a great quantity of rubble to clear away, after that, we will be able, in my view we will have to, restore sense to the analysis, according to the concept that was ours, but without falling back vertically into “visions” of prevalent dual antagonism, using the habitual, difficult to substitute but very unclear categories of the “dominator” and “dominated”. If some retarded person still intends to dabble in such dualisms, even using “exploiter” and “exploited” or “oppressor” and oppressed”. They would do well to get out of the way immediately. Don’t even take into consideration such terms as “rich” and “poor” or “privileged” or “disinherited”.
I conclude this, all in all, brief excursus on theory and practice (political). I offer it verbatim to that 10% (am I too optimistic?) who understand how theory, in the thinking human, is the maximum expression of practical action, that implies a reflection of the first , second , third, umpteenth degree. That is, in the meantime, we devote ourselves at the first approach to the chaotic world in which we have to move, if we want to live. The immediate “reflection” already requires the rough formulation of the draft of a theory. Those who stop at this primitive stage are usually not aware of the formation of such drafts in their brain; they think of themselves as only practical and despise the “theorists”, with whom we fix certain fields of stability; sometimes convinced, naively, that we have “reproduced the reality”. On these first approaches we reflect again and, once having readjusted the first fields, we establish others and then still others, until we seem to have arrived at the “most realistic” stability, appropriate to our activity.
Lenin said “without revolutionary thought, no revolutionary action”. Take away the term revolutionary that does not identify, if not in exceptional cases, our way of acting. That still leaves: no theory, no action. Theory and practice are the usual “two blades of the scissors”, apparently unequal but complimentary for “cutting”. If a blade is too worn it must be sharpened or replaced. I have used above the expression “great thinkers” in general terms but I hope it is clear to most and that nobody gets the idea that I consider them with irony. I have never had such a, in this case, foolish intention. We cannot live without such thinking. And even those who do not “think of it”, it is only because they consider the entire world has no given, defined sense. However, it appears to me obvious the harm caused by the confusion between the environment of the “great thinkers” and the stabilized fields of theories (being aspects of the practice of action). If practice and action are the two blades of the scissors, indispensable in our concrete intervention in the world, between them there is such a complementary interaction to make them in fact one “instrument, with which to act. It can happen that between the two blades there is a lack of coordination, a scarce reciprocal adaptation during use; the detection of the defect occurs relatively quickly, since eventually, the “reality” is no longer well “cut”.
Such a tight relationship is not formed between “theory and practice” and “the great meditation” that characterizes the different civilizations in diverse spatial and temporal contexts. Without doubt, they are complimentary, there is reciprocal influence, even in such relationships, nevertheless, with a higher grade of independence and, therefore, with the eventuality (not uncommon) of time lags and lapses, able to provoke serious problems for the integrity and the good “functioning” (of the reproduction of the relationships) of a given social formation. Using a very approximate metaphor, we can think of the latter as the “equipment” of for conditioning (maintaining the same temperature and degree of humidity) adequate for the luxuriant growth of plants and flowers in a greenhouse. The “scissors” are represented by the know-how of the “gardener” who takes care of the growth.
There are unfortunately, especially in these times, so many blunderheads who immediately transfer the “great thinkers” into the field of theory, replacing it with pernicious plots. Regrettably, they influence intellectual circles that are decidedly degraded, especially in periods of decadence of a social formation. In this way, incalculable damage is caused, which delays the overcoming of the “epochal crisis” of that formation. It is indispensable to denounce and severely criticize the most detrimental people who pronounce senseless phrases with a possible effect on weak and almost defenceless minds; they annihilate every rigour of a real search for a solution with centuries-old speeches of “hope” in worlds of which there is not the slightest sign of the advent. It is one thing to think of the “other world”, it is another to create fantasies about the world in which we really find ourselves, striving as well as we can to survive. And with that I conclude my excursus (still to a large extent provisional).
*Italian writer. Author of, among other books, “Capitalism Today” and “Oltre l’orizzonte” (“Beyond the horizon”), 2011 . Professor of Economics at the University of Pisa and Venice until 1996.
Article courtesy of THE OTHER NEWS
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